We develop a model of Schumpeterian growth where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry of high-quality competitors. Through personal relationships developed with the incumbent...

Using data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast...

Using data on a panel of 56 democratic countries in the period 1975-2004, we find evidence of a negative association between political stability and economic growth which is stronger and empirically more robust in countries with high bureaucratic costs. Motivated by these results, which contrast...

Using an endogenous growth model in which countries differ with respect to property rights protection, the paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of removing capital controls, and studies the political support for a reform which improves the quality of property rights. When these are...

Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provide evidence that political persistence (measured as the longest tenure in office of main political entities) is negatively associated with growth, after controlling for country and time fixed...

In this paper, we analyse the empirical relationship between social security expenditure and economic growth, using cross-country data for a sample of 61 countries and panel data for a sample of 20 industrialized countries. We find that, whenever a statistically significant association between...