We analyze voter preferences for eight General Elections for the Danish parliament by using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves,...

We compare Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) and Plurality Voting (PV) in elections with 3 candidates. Voters receive consequential benefits from the election of a candidate close to their preferred policy position and also benefit from expressing their preferences sincerely. We provide conditions...

Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognition of the importance of modeling institutional details in political processes. A sample of the literature on game-theoretic models of political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of...

Pivato and Soh [Pivato, M., Soh, A., 2020. Weighted representative democracy. Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (2020) 52--63] proposed a new system of democratic representation whereby any individual can choose any legislator as her representative and different legislators can represent...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of...

The strengths and weaknesses of federalism have been debated for centuries. But one major possible advantage of building decentralization and limited government into a constitution has been largely ignored in the debate so far: its potential for reducing the costs of widespread political...

We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When...

When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision-makers, so-called election inversions may take place, where each group have different majority outcomes. We identify two versions of such compound majority paradoxes specifically, but not exclusively,...