In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device …

with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device …

signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller induced certification leads to more transparency, because it is informative … demand for inspection. Whenever transparency is socially beneficial, seller certification is preferable. It also yields …

seller's information is not verifiable, and the reserve price works as a signaling device. In this paper, we consider an … that such a signaling incentive could decrease the seller's profit and probability of sale in equilibrium, with a larger …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller “rushes-out” by increasing the informativeness of …

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … quality of the asset, depending on the cost structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller …