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[Rezension von: Phlips, Louis, The economics of imperfect information]

Chalkley, Martin - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 100 (1990) 402, pp. 961-962

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001344315

Contracts, information and incentives in health care

Chalkley, Martin - In: The Elgar companion to health economics, (pp. 242-249). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003389362

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Social organization and mechanism design : …, (pp. 163-183). 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001463006

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 174-193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001379404

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Crémer, Jacques - In: Journal of economic theory 81 (1998) 1, pp. 163-200

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001244922

Gathering information before the contract is offered : the case with two states of nature

Crémer, Jacques - In: European economic review : EER 38 (1994) 3, pp. 675-682

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001163148

Gathering information before signing a contract

Crémer, Jacques - In: The American economic review 82 (1992) 3, pp. 566-578

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001126147

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645707

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645709

Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy Joseph - 2015

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494