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The curse of knowledge increases self-selection into competition : experimental evidence
Danz, David - 2014 - Rev.
overconfidence and overentry into competition. In a broader context, the results provide an explanation for the overconfidence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403249
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The Effect of Information Disclosure on Demand for High-Load Insurance
Ragin, Marc A. - 2020
high-load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy … tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive …-compatible insurance demand experiment in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850466
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Certification and market transparency
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - 2014
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403019
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Certification and market transparency
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - 2014
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491434
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The impact of heterogeneous signals on stock price predictability in a strategic trade model
Winter, Christoph - 2018
Generalizing the idea that price momentum can be explained by different levels of uncertainty inherent in the information structure, we implement signal-specific differences in uncertainty in a Kyle type model of strategic trading. We derive the equilibrium in a single-auction setting as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952637
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Certification and market transparency
Stahl, Konrad; Strausz, Roland - 2017
In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590937
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Informational hold up and intermediaries
Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14
Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
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Price discovery and gains from trade in asset markets with insider trading
Brünner, Tobias; Levínský, René - 2020
The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437539
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Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games
Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael - 2011
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180095
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Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy Joseph - 2015
When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494