We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets,...

We examine how developments in financial technology that improve information sharing affect lender specialization. Using the introduction of a U.S. commercial credit bureau, we document that lenders leverage their collateral expertise to enter new markets after joining. We exploit the staggered...

We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors' contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders' common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information sharing...

We show that mutual funds use information acquired by participating in the equity lending market to make portfolio allocation decisions. Using data from German mutual funds on their stock-level lending decisions, we find that funds lending shares are more likely to exit positions relative both...