We formalize a decentralized market where consumers with privately-known preferences meet bilaterally with firms. The latter acquire information to raise their degree of price discrimination from second to first. In a dynamic setting where outside options are endogenous, information choices are...

An unresolved problem in Bayesian decision theory is how to value and price information. This paper resolves both problems by assuming inexpensive information. Building on Large Deviation Theory, we produce a generically complete asymptotic order on samples of i.i.d. signals in finite-state,...

We extend the comparison of experiments in Blackwell (1953) to a strategic setting that both simplifies and expands upon ideas in Gossner (2000). We introduce a partial order on correlating signals, called more strategically informative, and prove that it is equivalent to the partial order more...

We prove that the recently proposed informational herding models are but special cases of a standard single person experimentation model with myopia. We then re-interpret the incorrect herding outcome as a familiar failure of complete learning in a optimal experimentation problem. We next...