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In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems — the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...
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The paper analyzes an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The problem is modeled as a dynamic mechanism design problem in which disability is unobservable. We show that an asset-tested disability system in which a disability transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467898
In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems -- the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456661
The paper analyzes an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a competitive equilibrium with taxes. The problem is modeled as a dynamic mechanism design problem in which disability is unobservable. We show that an asset-tested disability system in which a disability transfer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012757224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003386880
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