We consider an optimal insurance design problem for an individual whose preferences are dictated by the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) theory with a concave utility function and an inverse-S shaped probability distortion function. This type of RDEU is known to describe human behavior...

Arrow's classical result on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule holds in a situation where the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, the insured is a risk-averse EU-maximizer, and the two parties share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realizations of...

In the classical Expected-Utility framework, a problem of optimal insurance design with a premium constraint is equivalent to a problem of optimal insurance design with a minimum expected retention constraint. When the insurer has ambiguous beliefs represented by a non-additive probability...

We re-examine the problem of budget-constrained demand for insurance indemnification when the insured and the insurer disagree about the likelihoods associated with the realizations of the insurable loss. For ease of comparison with the classical literature, we adopt the original setting of...

We re-visit the problem of optimal insurance design under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) examined by Bernard et al. (2015), Xu (2018), and Xu et al. (2015). Unlike the latter, we do not impose the no sabotage condition on admissible indemnities, that is, the comonotonicity of indemnity...