An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes what moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided...

Political parties compete over income tax functions, and voters vote and decide whether to pay full taxes or to make an e®ort to modify their tax bur- den. We show that political parties only propose e±cient income tax func- tions, in a similar manner to the probabilistic voting theory....

The present article generalyses economic litterature on consumption tax incidence to general forms of consumption taxes. Previous studies were limited to the cases of per unit and ad valorem taxes. Three main contributions are provided. From a methodological point of view, the elasticity of the...