We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

The design of networks in their institutional and organizational aspects is a key determinant of their competitiveness. Consequently managers in agricultural and food industries have to address the question of governance design, i. e. of choices concerning the content and the architecture of...

I propose a model in which firms can convey their quality by listing on a stock exchange. To list, firms must comply with costly listing requirements allowing investors to recognize imperfectly their quality. A profit maximizing exchange may set listing requirements leading to high information...

La question posée par ce papier est la suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il souhaitable de taxer le secteur informel ? Un modèle théorique de taxation optimale permet d’abord de fournir une réponse analytique à cette question. Une version empirique du modèle permet ensuite d’estimer...