In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between p arties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union’s power is not too high.

In this paper we investigate the effects of two popular labour market institutions – namely, Monopoly Union (MU) and Efficient Bargaining (EB) – in a Cournot duopoly, in particular as regards the issue of the bargaining agenda. We show that, while when EB and Right-to- Manage arrangements...

In this paper we investigate the effects of two popular labour market institutions – namely, Monopoly Union and Efficient Bargaining – on market and welfare outcomes in a Cournot duopoly. We show that depending on values of the union power, the Monopoly Union institution may be preferred by...

We consider a unionised duopoly with efficient bargaining at the firm level (i.e. negotiations both on wage and employment). We show that if the target of unions is the total wage bill, then, as expected, consumer surplus and social welfare are the same of when the labour market is...

The present study considers a unionised duopoly with the two most popular labour market institutions, i.e. efficient bargaining (EB) and right to manage (RTM) unions and analyses product market stability under quantity competition. By focusing on the role played by labour market institutions on...

The present study considers a unionised (nonlinear) duopoly with two different labour market institutions, i.e. efficient bargaining (EB) and right to manage (RTM), to analyse product market stability under quantity competition with trade unions. We show that when the preference of unions...