We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more...

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more...

We propose a tractable model of an informationally inefficient market featuring non-revealing prices, no noise traders, and general assumptions on preferences and payoff distributions. We show the equivalence between our model and a substantially simpler model whereby investors face...

Biographical note: DuffieDarrell: Darrell Duffie is the Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. His books include "How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It" and "Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory" (both Princeton).

We characterize the price-transparency role of benchmarks in over-the-counter markets. A benchmark can, under conditions, raise social surplus by increasing the volume of beneficial trade, facilitating more efficient matching between dealers and customers, and reducing search costs. Although the...