Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria...

Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria...

Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria...

This paper empirically studies the impacts of intense exposure to the Cultural Revolution on individual's marriage decisions in China：timing of first marriage and denial in marriage. Consistent evidences from multiple national census datasets indicate that the intensely affected cohorts' first...

This paper develops a model of child custody based on an incomplete-contract approach to the allocation of property rights. Because of the presence of transaction costs in marriage, altruistic parents cannot contract upon the investments they make into their children, but can reduce the...

We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint custody. We show that some parents, who...

If women marry younger than men, increased population growth causes a surplus of women in the marriage market. This paper introduces search frictions into a matching model with transferable utility and age-dependent match payoffs to study if this so-calledmarriage squeeze has caused a dowry...

This paper proposes a general equilibrium approach to examine the marriage market and within-household transfers. Using observations on who matches with whom, I derive information on how efficiently the market functions and on agent's preferences in terms of mate choice. I use a multidimensional...

We investigate the role of marital patterns in explaining rising income inequality using a structural marriage matching model with unobserved heterogeneity. This allows us to consider both the extensive and intensive margins of the marriage market, i.e. who remains single and who marries whom....