Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Spatial wage differences other incentives to change the location of work either by commuting or by moving to the new work location. Combining an intensive labor supply margin with an extensive, productivity-enhancing margin of work place change due to commuting or moving, I study how spatial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011933517
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002706037
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002889467
We study the strategic incentives of regional governments to allocate their budget to public investment and to public consumption expenditures against the background of an incentive-compatible redistribution policy set by the central government. Regional investment changes the productivity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429124
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003268006
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065005
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318601
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277220
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009518277