We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to any policy before the election; they choose a non-linear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either...

This paper studies majority voting over non-linear income taxes when individuals respond to taxation by substituting untaxable leisure to taxable labor. We first show that voting cycle over progressive and regressive taxes is inevitable. This is because the middle-class can always lower its tax...

In a classic result, Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) showed that average-rate progressive, and only average-rate progressive, income taxes reduce income inequality. Carbonell-Nicolau and Llavador (2018) extended this result to the case of endogenous income, showing that marginal-rate...

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes - in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income - ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result...

The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976), according to which progressive and only progressive income taxes--in the sense of increasing average tax rates on income—ensure a reduction in income inequality. This result...