Within this paper an oligopolistic German electricity market is modelled by a game theoretic modelling tool representing a Nash equilibrium. Due to European electricity market liberalisation electricity producing and trading firms react strategically like global market players by joining and...

Nowadays, a process can be observed in Germany where electricity producing and trading firms react to the electricity market liberalisation by merging market shares, since the year 2000, which reduces the number of suppliers and influences production and consumer prices. This paper discusses...

Effects of renewable support legislation on electricity prices have been analyzed with a plethora of models. However, these models neglect at least one of the following aspects which we take into account in our analysis: oligopolistic market behavior of dominant firms, emission trading,...

We use a quantitative electricity market model to analyze the welfare effects of refunding a share of the emission trading proceeds to support renewable energy technologies that are subject to experience effects. We compare effects of supporting renewable energies under both perfect and...

Under perfect competition on the output market, first best technology subsidies in the presence of learning by doing are justified by knowledge spill overs that are not accounted for by individual companies. First best output subsidies are thus depending directly on the learning effects and are,...