The present paper analyzes the impact of a climate coalition's border carbon adjustment on emissions from commodity production, welfare and the coalition size. The coalition implements border carbon adjustment to reduce carbon leakage and to improve its terms of trade, while the fringe abstains...

This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto...

We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalition countries use border carbon adjustments to protect domestic producers. We find that lobbies in the outsider countries favor carbon taxes,...

We assess a 2-period, non-cooperative equilibrium of an n country policy game where countries chose either (i) carbon taxes, (ii) cap-and-trade policy with local permit markets or (iii) cap-and-trade policy with internationally linked permit markets and potential central redistribution of permit...

We study the influence of trade exposed producer lobby groups on national climate policies and the formation of a climate coalition if the coalition uses border carbon adjustment (BCA), protecting domestic industries. The countries regulate emissions from commodity production with carbon taxes....