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Market power in a system of tradeable CO 2 quotas

Westskog, Hege - In: The energy journal 17 (1996) 3, pp. 85-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001202980

Why should emissions trading be restricted?

Westskog, Hege - In: Climate policy 2 (2002) 1, pp. 97-103

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001840802

The design of a tradeable CO 2 quota system under market imperfections

Hagem, Cathrine - In: Climate agreements under limited participation, …. 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001323070

The design of a dynamic tradeable quota system under market imperfections

Hagem, Cathrine - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 36 (1998) 1, pp. 89-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001247443

Dominant agent and intertemporal emissions trading

Hagem, Cathrine (contributor); Westskog, Hege (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002621953

Should developing countries take on binding commitments in a climate agreement? : An assessment of gains and uncertainty

Kallbekken, Steffen; Westskog, Hege - In: The energy journal 26 (2005) 3, pp. 41-60

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003013718

Distributional constraints and efficiency in a tradable permit market

Hagem, Cathrine (contributor); Westskog, Hege (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003319056

Market power with interdependent demand : sale of emission permits and natural gas from Russia

Hagem, Catherine; Kallbekken, Steffen; Mæstad, Ottar; … - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 34 (2006) 2, pp. 211-227

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003339206

Allocating tradable permits on the basis of market price to achieve cost effectiveness

Hagem, Cathrine; Westskog, Hege - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 42 (2009) 2, pp. 139-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003811647

Dominant agent and intertemporal emissions trading

Hagem, Cathrine; Westskog, Hege - 2005

In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284285