We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is...

We consider an economy in which competitive firms use three technologies for electricity production: pollutive fossils, intermittent renewables like wind or solar, and storage. We determine optimal subsidies for renewables and storage capacities when carbon pricing is imperfect. This policy is...

Energy system and power market models refrain from distinguishing between private and social discount rates. We devise a strategy to account for diverging private and social discount rates in intertemporal optimization frameworks, resulting in an optimal carbon tax above the marginal damage when...

We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design...

In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is...

This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of common property resources in production economies with multiple inputs and outputs. It is derived from complementing the Walrasian solution by welfare bounds, whose ethical justification rests on commonality of ownership. We then apply...