Das Instrument des Emissionshandelssystems (EHS) wird von Umweltökonom:innen an prominenter Stelle zur Bewältigung der ökologischen Krisen sowohl im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs als auch in der Politikberatung empfohlen. Wir arbeiten drei implizite normative Prämissen des Lehrbuchmodells eines...

Das Instrument des Emissionshandelssystems (EHS) wird von Umweltökonom:innen an prominenter Stelle zur Bewältigung der ökologischen Krisen sowohl im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs als auch in der Politikberatung empfohlen. Wir arbeiten drei implizite normative Prämissen des Lehrbuchmodells eines...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries....

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a delegation problem in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents...

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...