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Formal performance appraisals (PA) are one of the most important human resource management practices in companies. In this paper, we focus on the reaction of employees to these performance assessments. In particular, we investigate the effect between the incidence of being formally evaluated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380550
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Formal performance appraisals (PA) are one of the most important human resource management practices in companies. In this paper, we focus on the reaction of employees to these performance assessments. In particular, we investigate the effect between the incidence of being formally evaluated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050444
Performance measurement and evaluation systems are among the most common management instruments. An integral element of this process is the use of targets, typically set in appraisal interviews and formalized via written target agreements. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231408
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A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003981608
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We investigate the use of performance appraisal (PA) in German Firms. First, we derive hypotheses on individual and job based determinants of PA usage. Based on a representative German data set on individual employees, we test these hypotheses and also explore the impact of PA on performance pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003539340
We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871952