Evidence suggests that managers have an incentive to keep information opaque with the market when negotiating with employees who can extract above-market rents from the firm. We argue that employee ownership should mitigate this incentive to extract above-market rents and, in turn, alleviate the...

Evidence suggests that managers have an incentive to keep information opaque with the market when negotiating with employees who can extract above-market rents from the firm. We argue that employee ownership should mitigate this incentive to extract above-market rents and, in turn, alleviate the...

We examine the impact of the cultural norm of uncertainty avoidance on employee stock option (ESO) exercise behaviour using proprietary data from a multinational firm. We find that employees from countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance exercise their stock options earlier. These...

Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock (generally positive link is observed for options). We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant...

Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock (positive link observed for options). We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant incentives to...