This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these...

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these...

European electricity markets are geographically organized in zones, which often resemble countries. Overload of power lines within zones have to be relieved through other means than the electricity market, e.g. so-called “redispatching” of power plants. Traditionally, this has often been...

We present a bottom-up electricity market model for Switzerland called Swissmod. It includes a detailed electricity network and hydropower representation. Swissmod captures the features and restrictions of run-of-river, yearly storage and pumped-storage power plants and combines this with a...

In zonal electricity markets, such as Europe's, system operators relieve congested power lines within bidding zones using out-of-market measures. One such measure is "redispatching" power plants, i.e. increasing the output of one power station while decreasing the output of another....