Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that...

Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that...

We characterize prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Bewley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility,...

In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from previously observed cases. For each observed sequence of cases the decision-maker predicts a set of priors expressing his beliefs about the underlying probability distribution. We impose a version of...