We conducted a set of experiments to compare the effect of ambiguity in single person decisions and games. Our results suggest that ambiguity has a bigger impact in games than in ball and urn problems. We find that ambiguity has the opposite effect in games of strategic substitutes and...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain either optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and...

A decision maker (DM) is asked to make choices from a set of acts, which entail both risk and uncertainty in the sense of knight (1921). Extending Raiffa's (1961) argument I show that, provided the DM can choose acts objectively randomly (by flipping her own fair coin, for instance), provided...

The paper proposes a framework to extend regret theory to dynamic contexts. The key idea is to conceive of a dynamic decision problem with regret as an intra-personal game in which the agent forms conjectures about the behaviour of the various counterfactual selves that he could have been. We...

We develop awareness-dependent subjective expected utility by taking unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2011a) as primitives in the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective expected utility. We observe that a decision maker is unaware of an event if and...

Several models of probabilistic choice under uncertainty allow for deterministic choice if one act state-wise dominates the other. Such models have a natural application in game theory where probabilistic choice corresponds to mixed strategies, deterministic choice — to pure strategies and...

The centipede game is a two-player finite game of perfect information where a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium appears to be intuitively unappealing and descriptively inadequate. This paper analyzes behavior in the centipede game when a traditional game-theoretical assumption that players...

This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...

We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' effort and skill, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because a...