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Non-Bayesian decision theory ahead of its time : the case of G. L. S. Shackle

Zappia, Carlo - In: Cambridge journal of economics 38 (2014) 5, pp. 1133-1154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437574

Daniel Ellsberg on the Ellsberg paradox

Zappia, Carlo - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856780

Rationality under uncertainty : classic and current criticisms of the Bayesian viewpoint

Zappia, Carlo - In: The European journal of the history of economic thought 25 (2018) 6, pp. 1387-1419

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012034584

Paradox? : what paradox? : on a brief correspondence between Leonard Savage and Karl Popper

Zappia, Carlo - In: Research in the history of economic thought and methodology 38 (2020) 3, pp. 161-177

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012614098

Il problema della conoscenza in Hayek

Zappia, Carlo - In: Incertezza, razionalità e decisioni economiche, (pp. 235-249). 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001569593

Shackle versus Savage : non-probabilistic alternatives to subjective probability theory in the 1950s

Zappia, Carlo; Basili, Marcello - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003319898

Shackle and modern decision theory

Basili, Marcello; Zappia, Carlo - In: Metroeconomica : international review of economics 60 (2009) 2, pp. 245-282

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003823798

De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning : a reply to Arthmar and Brady

Feduzi, Alberto; Runde, Jochen; Zappia, Carlo - In: History of economic ideas : HEI 25 (2017) 1, pp. 211-223

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012127528

Between worlds : Daniel Ellsberg (1931-2023)

Moscati, Ivan; Zappia, Carlo - In: Erasmus journal for philosophy and economics : EJPE 17 (2024) 1, pp. 364-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015048912

Shackle's Economic Agent and Modern Decision Theory

Basili, Marcello; Zappia, Carlo - 2004

This paper assesses the rationale of George Shackle's argument against Bayesian decision making in the light of recent developments of modern decision theory. The focus is on the so-called non-additive probability approach to decision theory under uncertainty, which, not unlike Shackle's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074577