Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments - pricing and network investment....

"Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments pricing and network investment....

This paper develops a simple model in which the government has asymmetric information about a monopolistic firm's marginal costs of providing an infrastructure service. The model is used to analyze the impact of asymmetric information and the threat of regulatory capture on optimal universal...

This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal, service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under...

The authors explore the relation between the establishment of a regulatory agency and the performance of the electricity sector. The authors exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level information on a representative sample of 220 electric utilities from 51 development and transition...

This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads...