Three theoretical non-point water pollution (NPS) control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon...

The goal of this experimental study was to test an effectiveness of a group contract designed to control nonpoint source water pollution from farms' runoff (Pushkarskaya 2003). In particular, the regulator pays for pollution reduction credits earned by the group of the farmers, who voluntary...

Point-nonpoint trading markets must accommodate the problem of monitoring individual nonpoint source discharges (NPS). A permit trading market that allows the regulator to monitor noncompliance based on observable aggregate NPS pollution levels, through the use of a collective enforcement...

Collective performance-based trading can be achieved by pairing a team contract with an auction to determine team membership. The auction effectively overcomes adverse selection, and the team contract reduces the incentive to "free-ride" associated with moral hazard in teams.

We employ a combination of survey design and econometric techniques to explore ways to deal with health concerns in restoration projects where environmental injuries are severe. We use data from a referendum contingent valuation survey for a natural resource restoration project to demonstrate...

Three theoretical non-point water pollution control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies – tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon...

Three theoretical non-point water pollution control schemes were tested repeatedly in experimental studies tax-subsidy scheme (K. Segerson, 1988), collective fining (Xepapadeas, 1991) and random fining (Xepapadeas, 1991). Camacho and Requate (2004) summarized results reported by Spraggon (2002),...

Theory predicts that incentive-based regulatory instruments reduce compliance costs by encouraging efficient resource allocation and innovation in environmental technology. Cost reductions from pollution permit trading often have exceeded expectations, but the devil is in the detail: the rules...

A comparative statics analysis shows that a compensated demand for LIS services exists. The theoretically correct welfare measure under certainty, the Hickstan compensating variation, is appropriate to the willingness to pay for land information. The value of this information is proportional to...