Relative to rational expectations models, learning models provide a theory of expectation formation where agents use observed data and a learning rule. Given the possibility of multiple equilibria under rational expectations, the learning literature often uses stability as a criterion to select...

This paper shows that under very general conditions, there exists a locally stable Nash equilibrium in games of strategic complements (GSC), as well as in the more general case of games with non-decreasing best response correspondences. While it is well known that in such cases a unique...

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

In a Nash equilibrium, players' rationality is mutual knowledge. However, both intuition and experimental evidence suggest that players do not know for sure the rationality of opponents. This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept, cautious equilibrium, that generalizes Nash equilibrium in...

A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of "independent strategies" as well as of "common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...

This note uses monotone methods to derive two sets of comparative statics results for monetary directed search models. First, it characterizes the impact of a higher inflation rate or a higher cost of using credit on market outcomes, regardless of the choice of matching function. Second, the...

The study demonstrates the possibility to use the notions and tools of physical potential theory in development of a general theory of economic potential. Production functions and functional of consumer or managerial preferences are treated as microeconomic potential functions. The gradients of...