The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and allows for intermediate cases with some restrictions on...

We provide a "computable counterexample" to the Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium existence theorem [2]. In particular, we find an exchange economy in which all components are (Turing) computable, but in which no competitive equilibrium is computable. This result can be interpreted as an...

We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price controls exist, the existence of competitive equilibria (the solution concept of classical market theory) is no longer guaranteed; hence, we...

Using a standard frictionless, continuous time, and continuous trading stochastic economy with heterogeneous beliefs, the purpose of this paper is to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibrium in an incomplete asset market. A new approach to proving existence is...

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility...

This paper provides a general framework to model bounded rationality in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents. A boundedly rational agent is associated with an information set $I$ and an extra parameter $\epsilon$, which can be interpreted as...

We establish that, when the number of agents is sufficiently large, but finite, there are open sets of economies with constrained Pareto inefficient equilibria, and provide a simple sufficient condition for CP inefficiency. We also show that there are open sets of economies with CPO equilibria.

The paper presents and studies a new concept of coalition domination for incomplete markets. It was elaborated applying a contractual approach and based on the notion of fuzzy contractual allocation, see Marakulin (2011, 2013). Core allocations are implemented by the net trades (webs of...

We solve a general equilibrium model of an incomplete market with heterogeneous preferences, identifying first-order and second-order effects. Several long-lived agents with different absolute risk-aversion and discount rates make consumption and investment decisions, borrowing from and lending...