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Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness

Schipper, Burkhard - 2021

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning … process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self … state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509154

Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - 2002

We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118720

Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium

Cordella, Tito; Datta, Manjira - 1997

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014103267

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2015

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029918

Chapter 6. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Wallace, Chris; Young, H. Peyton - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 327-380). 2015

Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. Evolutionary game theory differs in two key respects: the focus is on large populations of individuals who interact at random rather than on small numbers of players; and individuals are assumed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025453

Belief Free Equilibria

Compte, Olivier - 2013

The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082196

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2013

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071462

Equilibrium Existence in Global Games with General Payoff Structures

Hoffmann, Eric - 2019

We consider global games with general payoff structures and prove existence of equilibrium. This shows that the global games method is well-defined with arbitrary strategic interaction among players, thus providing a foundation for the study of more general equilibrium behavior, especially as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894111

Evolutionary stability in asymmetric oligopoly : a non-Walrasian result

Leininger, Wolfgang; Moghadam, Hamed M. - 2014

It is a very well-known result that in terms of evolutionary stability the long-run outcome of a Cournot oligopoly market with finitely many firms approaches the perfectly competitive Walrasian market outcome (Vega-Redondo, 1997). However, in this paper we show that an asymmetric structure in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399434

Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium

Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016

In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836