This paper provides a fully fledged equilibrium analysis for two-player sequential-move contests with complete information, while allowing for a full spectrum of the contest's accuracy and players' asymmetry. For a strong-lead contest, an interior equilibrium (both players are active) prevails...

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs equilibria rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion...

A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of "independent strategies" as well as of "common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...

In a Nash equilibrium, players' rationality is mutual knowledge. However, both intuition and experimental evidence suggest that players do not know for sure the rationality of opponents. This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept, cautious equilibrium, that generalizes Nash equilibrium in...

This paper proposes a criterion of equilibrium selection on coordination games based on the concept of value, which consists of a prior evaluation of an equilibrium by a player based on the salience of its efficiency or risk. Efficiency is defined as a function of an equilibrium's payoff. An...

This paper combines two strands of the experimental sunspot literature. It extends the rare literature that focuses experimentally on the coordination problems caused by sunspot variables. It also extends the literature that focuses on coordination games that have a payoff-dominant and a...

A sunspot variable is any random variable that is not related to fundamental factors of the economy but a potential coordination device. The coordination power of sunspots has been analysed in theory and in experiments. However, some have discussed whether sunspots, e.g., public announcements...