Consider a class of exchange economies in which preferences are continuous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian correspondence defined over this class violates Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) and is thus not Nash implementable. However, contrary to a result in...

We study a labor market with finitely many heterogeneous workers and firms to illustrate the decentralized (myopic) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and Shubik, 1971). A labor market is unstable if there is at...

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...