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Pavlov, Gregory - 2013

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated … and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is … robust to preplay communication between the bidders. If there are three or more symmetric bidders, or two symmetric bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257

Meaningful talk

Streb, Jorge M.; Torrens, Gustavo - 2015

This paper develops a semiotic-inferential model of verbal communication for incomplete information games: a language …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011290062

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153613

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153614

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2014

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141346

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076008

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054088

A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets

Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 1996

In his work on market signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a signaling market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and sellers choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. Spence also suggested that subjecting the dynamic process to rare perturbations might...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697462

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033