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Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium
Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
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Incorporating Fairness Motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Quantal Response Equilibrium Concepts : An Application to 2x2 Games
Tavoni, Alessandro - 2009
Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157464
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Incorporating fairness motives into the impulse balance equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium concepts : an application to 2x2 games
Tavoni, Alessandro - 2009
Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008811006
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Strongly symmetric equilibria in bandit games
Hörner, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre; Rady, Sven - 2014 - This version: August 17, 2014
This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010402918
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Peer-Confirming Equilibrium
Lipnowski, Elliot - 2018
routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer …-confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this intuition in a noncooperative game. We augment a game with a network to … represent strategic information: if two players are linked in the network, they have correct conjectures about each others …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934992
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Equilibrium Homophily in Networks
Boucher, Vincent - 2018
I look at the equilibrium effects of homophily in network formation games having positive externalities. I show that … very weak preferences for network effects (such as preference for being part of a clique) may result in very high levels of … homophily at equilibrium. I present an empirical procedure that allows an evaluation of the role of network effects on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909699
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153613
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The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013
We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153614
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2014
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141346
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The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency
Bergemann, Dirk - 2013
We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076008