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A Note on Walrasian Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Aggregate Uncertainty

Gottardi, Piero; Jerez, Belén - 2013

In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) [PT] have shown that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria extend to economies with moral hazard, when agents' trades are observable (exclusive contracts can be implemented). More recently, Bennardo and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054245

Implementability, Walrasian equilibria and efficient matchings

Dworczak, Piotr; Zhang, Anthony Lee - 2016

In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862156

Pavlov, Gregory - 2013

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated … and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is … robust to preplay communication between the bidders. If there are three or more symmetric bidders, or two symmetric bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257