Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer-confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this...

This paper investigates the existence of unique equilibrium in two-good economies where agents have preferences with the same relative risk aversion and different utility weights. Aggregate demand behavior is characterized in terms of both macrolevel and micro-level information inherent in the...

Previous research on public-good games revealed greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this has been seen as evidence of generosity being intuitive. We caution that fast decisions are more prone to error, and...

Response time is increasingly used to shed light on the process by which individuals make decisions. As mistakes may be correlated with response time it could, however, be misleading to use this measure to draw inference on preferences. To demonstrate we build on a recent literature, which uses...

Research on public-good games reveals greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this is seen as evidence of generosity being intuitive. We caution that mistakes may lead to the observed comparative static....

Introduction to Strategic Form Games -- Dominance -- Rationalizability -- Nash Equilibrium -- Perfect Equilibrium -- Evolutionary Stable Strategies -- Correlated Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- Introduction to Extensive Form Games -- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- Sequential...