Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game-theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure-strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a...

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

This paper studies a new refinement for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). BEIC requires players to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical...

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...