We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue that our model is the appropriate...

Most papers that employ the strategy method (SM) use many observations per subject to study responses to rare or off-equilibrium behavior that cannot be observed using direct elicitation (DE), but ignore that the strategic equivalence between SM and DE holds for the monetary payoff game but not...

Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game...

In this paper we study the configuration dynamics and the societal equilibrium selection of repeated lattice games. Each player plays games only with his immediate neighbors hence indirectly interacts with everyone else. A player may or may not have perfect control over his action. Different...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively...

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...

This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is found that if behaviour is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run...

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a...

We introduce a framework for analyzing Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite Arrow-Debreu exchange economies. A key feature is the way trade takes place. There are two main stages. In the first stage agents simultaneously choose prices and quantities of commodities they want to sell; in the...