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We analyze pre and post-task confidence in an experiment in which subjects bid in multi-unit common value auctions. Subjects return for a second session, so we are able to assess how performance affects the evolution of confidence. Those with low confidence prior to the first session...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090267
To estimate demand for labor, we use a combination of detailed employment data and the outcomes of procurement auctions, and compare the employment of the winner of an auction with the employment of the second ranked firm (i.e. the runner-up firm). Assuming similar ex-ante winning probabilities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011854110
This paper studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156136
This paper analyzes risk aversion in discriminatory share auctions. I generalize the k-step share auction model of … risk aversion. I also derive necessary conditions for best-response behavior, which allows to fit risk preferences to the …-quality beef. Rents are overestimated and rent extraction is underestimated when ignoring risk aversion. Small bidders (small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244684
We study identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk averse bidders and selective entry, building on … a flexible entry and bidding framework we call the Affiliated Signal with Risk Aversion (AS-RA) model. Assuming that the …. Given variation in either competition or costs, this characterization implies that risk neutrality is nonparametrically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824644
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This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175755
I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224544