This paper considers the eff ects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

This paper considers the effects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential equations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing...

We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. Our fine-grained data — a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers — allow us to estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. Our fine-grained data -- a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers -- allow us to estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated...

We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. Our fine-grained data - a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers - allow us to estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated...

We study the interplay of inequality and trust in a dynamic game, in which trust increases efficiency and thus allows higher growth of the experimental economy in the future. We find that trust is initially high in a treatment starting with equal endowments, but decreases over time. In a...

The traditional literature treat wage dispersion and firm dynamics, which are closely connected to each other, in isolation. This paper delivers a unified treatment to wage dispersion and firm-size distribution by developing a real-option-theoretic approach. The model is tractable with analytic...

We analyze the quantitative asset-pricing implications of peers' strategic rivalry by embedding oligopolistic competition within an endowment economy. Rivalry intensity increases endogenously as the discount rate rises or expected growth declines, because peers care less about future...