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In equilibrium play of a two-round tournament we find that underdogs exert more effort in the opening round while favorites save more effort for the final. Ability differences between players are therefore compressed in the opening round so upsets are more likely, and amplified in the final so...
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We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation … support reputational equilibria with more investment, even without liberalization. So we find a resources curse, where larger … resource endowments can decrease investment and reduce the ruler's revenue. The ruler's incentive to liberalize can be greatest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698620
This paper analyzes a discriminatory share auction in which bidders submit non-increasing step functions with a bounded number of steps, the type space consists of private non-increasing marginal valuation functions, and the number of participants is random. I show that the interim utility can...
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This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...
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We study the fragility of discretionary liquidity provision by major financial intermediaries during systemic events. The laboratory of our study is the recent collapse of the auction rate securities (ARS) market. Using a comprehensive dataset constructed from auction reports and intraday...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179447
I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224544