This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...

A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility...

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...

In this paper we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first-step, we estimate the bid density and distribution using local polynomial method, and recover a sample of (pseudo) private values. In the second-step, we apply the method of moments...

We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues. We describe some basic concepts, to highlight some strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and so...

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...

We analyze pre and post-task confidence in an experiment in which subjects bid in multi-unit common value auctions. Subjects return for a second session, so we are able to assess how performance affects the evolution of confidence. Those with low confidence prior to the first session...

We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple leader-follower game. We then explicitly derive the primary dealer's (follower) strategic choice of bids as a function of its customer's (leader) bids and show that an increase...

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on...