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Do firms provide wage insurance against shocks?

Kátay, Gábor - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 118 (2016) 1, pp. 105-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441593

An empirical estimation of NCAA head football coaches contract duration

Brook, Stacey L. - In: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 244 (2024) 5/6, pp. 513-531

employment survival, these studies ignore the impact of contract modifications. Using an accelerated failure time survival model … with hand-collected college head football coach contract data, I find that race/ethnicity affects the hazard rate of … contract modifications but not the hazard rate of a head coach's dismissal. Additionally, analysis of employment duration …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015326318

Are shorter cumulative temporary contracts worse stepping stones? : evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

Kabátek, Jan; Liang, Ying; Zheng, Kun - In: Labour economics : official journal of the European … 84 (2023), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451740

Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs : theory and empirical evidence

Dubois, Pierre; Jullien, Bruno; Magnac, Thierry - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003413701

Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs : theory and empirical evidence

Dubois, Pierre (contributor); Jullien, Bruno (contributor); … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003630524

The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions

Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662