Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039757
Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade-offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010468762
Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in Cambridge. Such strategizing can complicate preference analysis. This paper develops empirical methods for studying random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457891
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012395674
While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482283
While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize educational achievement, and transplantation communities focus on patient survival. It is unclear whether choice-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014090930
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015401154