This study examines the speed of adjustment of the leverage and regulatory capital ratios between 2002 and 2018 for large commercial banks of the USA. The study applies a two-step system GMM technique to obtain the speed of adjustment. The results prove that higher-quality capital requires...

The study aims to investigate the effect of conventional capital ratio, risk-based capital ratio, and capital buffer ratio on commercial bank risk-taking over the period from 2002 to 2019 using a two-step GMM method. The finding reveals that there is a positive relationship between traditional...

To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks’ risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks' risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

In this paper we aim to find out whether bank specialization and bank capitalization affect the relationship between bank loan growth and bank capital ratio, both in expansions and in contractions. We hypothesize that the impact of bank capital on lending is relatively strong in cooperative...

Asset encumbrance is a central concept in the context of banks’ liquidity crises, as it is associated with their capacity to obtain secured funding. This occasional paper summarises the work carried out by the task force on asset encumbrance, bringing together analyses by the ECB and those...

This paper presents a framework for estimating losses in the residential real estate mortgage portfolios of German banks. We develop an EL model where LGD estimates are based on current collateral values and PD dynamics are estimated using a structural PVAR approach. We confirm empirically that...

If regulation fails to differentiate between priced and idiosyncratic risk, it incentivizes investors to reach for yield. Studying securitization exposures on the balance sheets of German banks, I show evidence consistent with this prediction. Banks with tight regulatory constraints (low capital...

The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic effect of these incentives is an empirical...