This paper shows that collateral constraints restrict entrepreneurial activity. Our empirical strategy uses variations in local house prices as shocks to the value of collateral available to individuals owning a house and controls for local demand shocks by comparing entrepreneurial activity of...

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownershipaffects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes varia-tion in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industryand intra-firm cross-market...

We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

What is the effect of unionization on corporate financial policies? The average unionized firm responds with lower cash and higher leverage to a unionization election than the average firm escaping unionization. However, using a regression discontinuity design I find that the causal effect of...

When one firm's strategy affects other firms' value, optimal executive incentives depend on whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output. Hence, greater...

This paper shows that collateral constraints restrict entrepreneurial activity. Our empirical strategy uses variations in local house prices as shocks to the value of collateral available to individuals owning a house and controls for local demand shocks by comparing entrepreneurial activity of...