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The goal of this paper is to develop techniques to simplify semiparametric inference. We do this by deriving a number of numerical equivalence results. These illustrate that in many cases, one can obtain estimates of semiparametric variances using standard formulas derived in the...
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In this note, we characterize the semiparametric efficiency bound for a class of semiparametric models in which the unknown nuisance functions are identified via nonparametric conditional moment restrictions with possibly non-nested or over-lapping conditioning sets, and the finite dimensional...
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Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimators introduced by McFadden (1989)and Pakes and Pollard (1989) are of great use to applied economists. They are relatively easy to use even for estimating very complicated economic models. One simply needs to generate simulated data according to the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013127757
We introduce two simple new variants of the Jackknife Instrumental Variables (JIVE) estimator for overidentified linear models and show that they are superior to the existing JIVE estimator, significantly improving on its small sample bias properties. We also compare our new estimators to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723860
Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117259
Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed, and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126239