We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may differ in the liquidity they provide. Moreover, traders have idiosyncratic preferences for the markets, e.g. due to differential time preferences for...

Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...

This study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve efficient coordination. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can...

In this paper, we consider situations where agents face repeatedly the same decision problem. We focus on adaptive rules without beliefs. We distinguish between two kinds of models. Firstly, we study adaptive rules that are only based on private information. Decisions are made on the basis of...

This paper presents results on stochastic stability in evolutionary game theory. We will see that imitation processes with bounded memory and sampling (Josephson, Matros, 2004) select Pareto outcomes whereas Fictitious Play processes with bounded memory select risk-dominant outcomes in the sense...

Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce ''cleverness'' of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...